Can there be accountability for an illegal war ?

The decision of any government to go to war is a critically important one, and not surprisingly the part played by the UK in the recent war in Iraq, has raised profound concerns as to its basis in morality, common sense and legality. The ensuing public debate will continue as the Hutton report is released, and thereafter. What is highly significant about this debate is the key role played by international law. By comparison the doctrine of humanitarian intervention used to justify the NATO war in Kosovo, itself highly controversial amongst international lawyers, did not capture the same public attention.

Why did international law have such a key role? One answer is that the question of legality goes to the heart of the political and moral acceptability of the war. Another answer highlights the flowering of international law even though some would argue its weakness has been underlined by the unilateral action taken by the US and UK. A third answer is to examine the role of other than state parties in making the issue of legality a key question. This article explores the efforts of a group of lawyers, peace activists and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to make the UK Government accountable for its actions in Iraq. It discusses what possibilities there are, in the tradition of cause lawyering, to expose abuses of power in the context of war, and explores both the potential, particularly through non-litigious means, as well as the constraints of such action.

The legal issues raised by the war in Iraq are of profound importance and complexity. There are four critical areas:

The right of states within international law to resort to force
The lawfulness of the use of force
The legality of the occupation
Human rights issues arising from the occupation

International, international humanitarian, international criminal and international human rights law is engaged. The questions raised include: Could the UK or US rely on the right to pre-emptive action in self-defence? Did UN Security Council Resolutions and particularly 1441 authorise force? Are states permitted to unilaterally interpret SC resolutions to justify force? What are the implications within the new International Criminal Court? If no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are found does this lend retrospective effect to the war's illegality? Only some of the many questions raised can be discussed briefly in this narrative but a forthcoming publication, The Case for War, will make available all the opinions, reports, articles, letters and judgments referred to below.[1]

This campaign of cause lawyering continues. It has to date 4 stages.

Stage 1: Action Pre R 1441 Of 8 November 2002

The campaign began on August 12 2002 when a group of activists and lawyers met to discuss how to make the UK Government accountable for the war it advocated. A key understanding was that present case law on justiciability in the context of defence or foreign policy made it unlikely that there would be a judicial review of any governmental decision to go to war.[2] Therefore, it was decided to use a people's law approach to ventilate these issues in public and a public inquiry was held in Gray's Inn on October 11 2002. Two teams of lawyers, including counsel, were engaged to replicate closely the judicial review process. The NGO for illegality, Peacerights, instructed Rabinder Singh QC and an opinion was released. This opinion focused on 2 key questions: one, could the UK use force in self-defence and two, did existing SCRs authorise force now? The second question is examined in more detail below as it became, post-Resolution 1441, the Government's case. However in judging the effectiveness of this campaign, it is worth looking at the first as at that time it was an option actively canvassed by the government.

The UK's right to self-defence

Any argument about the legality of force in international law proceeds from the same basis: that the UN's purposes are essentially peaceful,[3] and that there is by Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter a prohibition against the use of force subject to two limited exceptions.[4] The first of these is the right to self-defence under Art. 51. At this time the UK appeared to be arguing either that the threat from Iraq to the UK from its links to international terrorism, or from its WMD, or both, were so serious that a pre-emptive strike in self-defence was justified, or that the threat to the US was such that the UK could invoke the right of collective self-defence. The legal opinion left no room for doubt that neither was justified. It emphasised that on pre-emptive strikes state practice "tends to suggest that the anticipatory use of force is not generally considered lawful, or only in situations of great emergency": a situation where an armed attack is launched or immediately threatened, and where there is an urgent necessity for defensive action against such attack, and no practicable alternative to action in self-defence. Applying these principles to the credible evidence about the seriousness of the threat from Iraq the opinion concluded the right to use force in anticipatory self-defence did not arise for the UK alone, or on the basis of collective self-defence with the US. In particular there was no evidence to link Iraq to September 11 or Al-Qa'ida, and that the government's dossier released on 24 September did not meet these conditions. Once the weakness of the case on self-defence had been exposed it was noteworthy that both the UK and US governments changed tack and began to argue for the second exception, namely, a SC authorisation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.[5]

The October 11 Inquiry

This inquiry was inspired by the approach to people's law, for long developed by the Permanent People's Tribunal.[6] The "judge" was professor Colin Warbrick of Durham University who heard careful legal argument based on skeleton arguments over a day hearing. The sponsoring group had obtained key publicity for their arguments when the Singh opinion had been released including live coverage on TV and the Today programme, and more followed the inquiry. It was all part of the strategy of raising public consciousness. Professor Warbrick's adjudication of 30 October 2002 concluded that force could not be used under either exception: self-defence or a SC authorisation. Mr Singh's arguments had foreshadowed what was to become the government's case, based on the Attorney General's statement of March 2003, that it was entitled to rely on the authorisation of R 678 from November 1990, notwithstanding the ceasefire resolution of R 687. Professor Warbrick concluded: "the argument that the power in Resolution 678 both survives and is adequate to justify unilateral state action will not stand up to examination. This authorisation is to "the states cooperating with the government of Kuwait" to take action effectively to restore the authority of the government of Kuwait…. and to restore international peace and security in the area….- but the coalition is no longer in existence…. The argument that Resolution 678 is a residuary right to use force fails to take into account the original reassertion of authority over the situation by the council in Resolution 687."

On December 19 BBC Radio 4's Today programme borrowed this idea and held their own shadow hearing again mirroring a judicial review. This time the "judge" was Professor Vaughn-Lowe, and again a conclusion was reached that, notwithstanding R 1441, without an express authorisation from the UN SC it would be contrary to international law for the UK to use force against Iraq.

Stage 2: Pre-Emptive Action Post R 1441

Intense diplomatic negotiation preceded the adoption of R 1441. In particular small amendments were made to ensure that if under the new enhanced weapons inspections regime, either UNMOVIC or the IAEA [7] reported that Iraq failed to comply with its disarmament obligations it was for the SC to convene immediately in order to consider the situation. There would not have been unanimity if both the UK and US government's ambassadors had not assured the world community, and the other members of the SC, that there were no "hidden triggers" or "automaticity" in the resolution.

However, at the same time Jack Straw made it clear to Parliament that military action would be taken if required if the SC vetoed a further resolution [8] and that "military action is bound to follow if Saddam Hussain does not co-operate fully with the terms of this resolution."[9] CND were one of many NGOs who had serious concerns about these, and other, indications that the UK intended to use force notwithstanding the terms of R 1441. A second opinion from Singh (and Charlotte Kilroy) was released which advised that the decision to use force based on R1441 would be in breach of international law, as a second SC R clearly authorising force was required. The opinion analysed the background to the adoption of the resolution as a guide to its interpretation and the system established by paragraphs 11 and 12 for Iraq's failure to comply with its terms to be reported to the SC who remained "seized of the matter." It noted that US and UK efforts to persuade the SC to adopt an earlier draft resolution containing an auhorisation by the usual phrase "all necessary means" had failed. It advised that the phrases "final opportunity" and "serious consequences" were no more than warnings to Iraq, not authorisations addressed to member states. It concluded: "It would be extraordinary if, having failed to obtain an express authorisation for the use of force, having incorporated minute changes to the final draft whose sole purpose was to exclude the possibility of "automaticity" and "hidden triggers" and to preserve the role of the Security Council and having publicly agreed in their explanation of the vote for adoption of SC R 1441 that there was no such implied authorisation for force, the UK and US were to be able to use SC R 1441 as authority for the use of force without a further Security Council Resolution" (para. 40). When the Treasury Solicitor, acting for the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary, responded to a letter before action on 26 November that it would not declare its understanding of what R 1441 permitted, proceedings were lodged 2 days later, and a Directions Hearing on 29 November listed for a 2 day hearing on 9 December three preliminary issues of justiciability, standing and delay.

The Issue of Costs: The first ever Pre-emptive Costs Order

CND are a private company limited by guarantee with limited funds. It had serious concerns about costs. As for its lawyers' fees there was to be a very successful fundraising campaign led by Mark Thomas, the Channel 4 comedian, and some of the work was provided without charge. The concern was the government's costs if it lost. Thus on 29 November a letter was written to the Treasury Solicitors offering to put £25,000 into an account on trust for the government's costs with an explanation as to why, in the public interest, this case should proceed with CND having certainty as to its liability. When the government refused the offer a hearing took place in the Divisional Court on 5 December. CND obtained the first ever pre-emptive costs order since the court held the issues were of genuine public importance and it was right to give CND the certainty it needed to be able to pursue them. National press coverage for this success was obtained.

The judgment of the Divisional Court

CND's lawyers did not seem to constrain the executive as to whether to take military action, or whether or how to deploy troops. In the light of recent cases on justiciability (including Abbasi [10]) this would have been clearly into the forbidden areas. Instead it was argued that the government repeatedly said it would be bound by international law, had indicated that it would go to war without a second SC Resolution (which
subsequently proved to be the case), but what was at stake was a pre-emtory norm of customary international law (the prohibition against force), and that the Court could exercise its discretion to give an advisory opinion.

The Divisional Court (Simon Brown, Maurice Kay, Richards LJJ) gave judgment on 17 December. They gave permission to move for judicial review but dismissed the application. Simon Brown LJ held:

The Court has no jurisdiction to declare the true interpretation of an international instrument (R 1441) which has not been incorporated into English domestic law and which it is unnecessary to interpret for the purposes of determining a person's rights or duties.
The Court would not determine an issue if to do so would be damaging to the public interest in the field of international relations, national security or defence.
There was no demonstrably good reason for a making an advisory declaration.

The strategy to pursue this issue through judicial review involved a very careful weighing up exercise at all stages of the costs and benefits. It was seen as a very positive exercise by CND, despite the ultimate failure. The costs were limited and covered by a fundraising campaign. Much public attention was given to the issue of illegality generally, and within the specific context of R 1441, and on 9 and 10 December there was extensive coverage in all forms of national and regional media. CND raised its public profile making clear that it was concerned not just with nuclear weapons but with the peaceful resolution of conflict between states. The pre-emptive costs order was another bonus, as was the studied approach of the Divisional Court and the many compliments paid to the "excellent submissions" of CND's lawyers. Although the approach of the court to issues of international law is a point of public importance justifying an appeal, a decision was made that CND had gone far enough. However a further strategy was already evolving.

Stage 3: Further Pre-Emptive Action

War Crimes: Letters before action

It is well known that during the wars in the Gulf, Kosovo and Afghanistan there were many incidents involving indiscriminate or disproportionate force. For example, the deliberate massacre, without quarter, of tens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers and civilians on the road to Basra on February 26 and 27, 1991, the destruction of homes, schools, shops and the Iraqi infrastructure, and the use of cluster bombs in all three conflicts. Acting on behalf of Mark Thomas, CND and 16 other NGOs lawyers served letters on Blair, Hoon and Straw on 22 January 2003.[11]

The letters documented he best evidence as to war crimes committed in the three previous conflicts. It set out the relevant provisions of international criminal and international humanitarian law, and in particular that the new ICC prosecutor has powers under Article 15 of the Rome Statute to initiate an investigation of his own initiative. It gave notice that a coalition of NGOs in different countries would be collecting evidence as to war crimes if the war took place, for example, as to the use of cluster bombs in urban areas or attacks on electricity supplies. At the end of the war a tribunal consisting of leading international lawyers would sit to establish the relevant legal principles for a hi-tech war. Thereafter it would hear evidence from eye witnesses and weapons experts to enable it to determine whether particular attacks were compliant with principles of discrimination, necessity and proportionality. If the panel concluded that evidence existed that war crimes have been committed it would report to the prosecutor who would be urged to use his Article 15 powers.

The Tribunal Hearing

Now that the war has ended it is abundantly clear that serious concerns arise as to war crimes especially in the context of the use of cluster bombs in urban areas. The Armed Forces minister has confirmed that despite an assurance that they would not be so used the UK did deploy them. It is difficult to see how these necessarily indiscriminate weapons can satisfy key principles of necessity and proportionality, or what military objective could only be achieved by these weapons and none other. A panel of 7 leading international lawyers have been assembled for a tribunal hearing on 8-9 November 2003 in London. [12]

The Government's Case for War

By mid-January it seemed clear that the UK Government had made up its mind for war, and that it would rely either on a second SC Resolution authorising force if it can get one or something lesser if it could not. A lesser option was thought by the team of lawyers to be a combination of SC Rs 678, 687 and 1441. As we now know this was indeed to be the basis of the Attorney General's statement of 17 March 2003. [13] The Attorney General's position was in simple terms that SC R 678 was extant and could be revived by a material breach of R 678, which set out Iraq's disarmament obligations, plus a further material breach of R 1441 bearing in mind the warnings of "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" and the serious consequences if it did not of operative paragraphs 3, 4 and 13 of R 1441. It is immediately apparent that if the authorisation of force from R 678 was not capable of being revived, because it had been terminated, the Government's arguments for legality fall away. The team now set about showing the public and the Commons that, in this critical period of the build up to war, this was indeed the case, the government could not rely on Rs 678, 687 and 1441 and that a fresh SC authorisation was required.

The 23 January opinion on R 678

A previous opinion on R 1441 had already established why a fresh authorisation was required, and the first opinion of 10 September advised that current SC Rs did not authorise force. This next opinion addressed the specific question as to whether the authorisation to use force contained in R 678 may be reactivated on Iraq's breach of R 678 so as to entitle the UK to use force without a further UN SC Resolution. It is noted that the revival of this authorisation, by this route, in order to force Iraq to meet the disarmament obligations set out in R 687 was, and is, the UK's only route to legality.
There are five arguments against legality through this route:

R 687 which introduced the ceasefire agreement was preceded by R 686 which acknowledged the suspension of hostilities. By OP 4 it explicitly recognised that during the period required for Iraq to comply with the terms of the provisional ceasefire, the authorisation from R 678 would remain valid. No such explicit language is present in 687 and as the opinion stated: "If the Security Council had sought to use the authorisation to use force contained in resolution 678 alive pending Iraq's compliance with the provisions of resolution 687, in our view Resolution 686 demonstrates that it could and would have done so." Similar conclusions were reached by Professors Warbrick (as we have seen) and Vaughn-Lowe.
R 687 provided for a formal cease-fire to be effective upon official notification by Iraq of "it's acceptance" of the provisions of R 687. Once it had accepted them, as it did, the authorisation of 678 ended. If the SC had wanted to keep it suspended like the sword of Damocles, to ensure Iraqi compliance with 687's disarmament obligations it could have done so. It did not.
R 678 authorised the "member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait.…to use….all necessary means….to restore international peace and security in the area…" It is apparent that once Iraq had notified it's acceptance of the provisions of R 687, and the UN's observer unit deployed, the coalitions work was ended, and it ceased to be in existence. The authorisation of force ended with it.
By OP34 the SC resolved to remain actively seized of the matter. It is clear from that and the wording of R687 that any steps taken for the implementation of R 687 and to secure peace and security in the region were now once more a matter for the SC and not for the member states who had formed the coalition.
Bearing in mind the UN Charter's peaceful purposes and the prohibition against the use of force if is not for member states acting unilaterally to interpret SC resolutions so as to authorise force. It is plain from recent conflicts in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and the Gulf War that if the SC mean to authorise force it does so in clear terms using the phrase "all necessary means."

Time has been spent on these arguments as it is immediately apparent that accountability for the war's illegality is still a possibility. I shall return to how even the government's case for legality collapses in the absence of WMD.

The 3 March opinion on the Draft Resolution

The UK and US Governments initially acknowledged that R 1441 was not enough and that a second SC Resolution was required. However, the spin doctors had us believe that what was key was whether this second resolution was passed, not what was in it, and in particular whether it specifically authorised force. As it turned out the UK and US abandoned the attempt even to have a bland second resolution adopted. However on 24 February a draft resolution was released by the UK and US. The fourth in the series of 6 opinions focused on this draft. Essentially this draft said little. After a series of preambular paragraphs the two operative paragraphs stated that "Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it in R 1441" and that the SC "decides to remain seized of the matter. The opinion noted that the phrase "all necessary means" or such like was absent, the preamble does not have operative effect, the warning of a final opportunity expressly envisages that a further decision will be taken by the SC as to what steps should be taken, and that accordingly "any attack by the US and the UK on Iraq in reliance on the Draft Resolution either alone or in conjunction with Resolution 1441 would be in breach of international law."

The Attorney General's Opinion and all that

By mid-March the question of legality had become key especially as it became clear that there was not to be political agreement amongst SC members for a second resolution, let alone one authorising force. It became clear that the government's case for legality had shifted away from requiring either a SC authorisation or, indeed, a second resolution. The clamour increased that the government make public its legal advice. Of course it is well known that Peter Goldsmith, the Attorney General, is a commercial and not an international lawyer, and that his statement to the Houses of Parliament of 17 March was no more than a summary of advice received from elsewhere. [14]

The Attorney General's statement was not, in my view, a proper one for a law officer to make. He could not have been unaware of the arguments of Rabinder Singh QC, Professors Warbrick and Vaughn Lowe, and others, that R 686's wording gave a key understanding as to why R 687 did not suspend the authorisation of 678 but terminated it. He ignored R 686's existence and the counter arguments. He had a duty not to misinform Parliament and the public. He broke it.

The team's last ditch efforts to prevent the inevitable included 2 briefing sessions to MPs in the House of Commons as to why the government's position was one of illegality, and a response to the Attorney General's statement which was published in the Solicitor's journal on 18 March.

Stage 4: Action Post-War

The central strategy is to make the government accountable for its actions. As far as war crimes go I have already described the tribunal to be held on 8-9 November 2002. There are three other themes to the continuing work to secure accountability for the decision to wage an illegal war, for the illegality of the occupation, and for violations of the human rights of Iraqi civilians.

The missing WMD

Even if the government's analysis of the law were accepted the missing WMD blows a hole in its case for legality. The Attorney General's statement is posited on the proposition that the evidence before him as to Iraq's WMD was so compelling, the threat so serious, so imminent, that Hans Blix's team at UNMOVIC could be given no more time despite having made excellent progress. The UK must go in now to ensure immediate compliance with R 687's disarmament obligations. It cannot reasonably be argued this is not his position as shown by his advice on the legality of occupation dated 26 March 2003 published in the New Statesman on 26 May. He reminds the Government that "military action pursuant to the authorisation in Resolution 678 (1990) must be limited to what is necessary to achieve the objectives of that Resolution, namely Iraqi disarmament and must be a proportionate response to that objective." [15] It must be emphasised that at best the government's case is that as retrospectively it is known that the threat of WMD was not apt to induce such a state of emergency that UNMOVIC's programme for disarmament must be overridden, and the SC not given a further opportunity to consider the matter, it can be seen that the war was illegal. Indeed it is noted that SC 1483, on the future administration of Iraq, did not endorse legality. At worst, if there is the merest hint that the evidence as to seriousness and imminence was exaggerated (deliberately or otherwise) the government should resign. Thus, the issue of the evidence before the Attorney General when he gave his statement of 17 March as to the seriousness and imminence of the threat is critical. We do, of course have the reports of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee's inquiry, the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee's inquiry and the Hutton inquiry. Nevertheless the combination of all of these is not sufficient to establish the quality, reliability and strength of the evidence which was relied on to lay the factual foundations for the basis in law of the government's case.

Calls for a judicial inquiry

On 6 June a fifth legal opinion was released and sent to the Treasury Solicitors. This advised "that the allegations made by former members of the cabinet in the recent past, that the evidence of the existence of weapons of mass destruction was exaggerated by the UK and US prior to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 call into question the factual foundation for the Attorney General's view that the invasion was lawful in international law. In our view there is therefore a strong case for establishing a judicial inquiry to examine that legal question." The Treasury Solicitor's response was that the government saw no need for a judicial inquiry and relied on the two forthcoming Parliamentary inquiries. The addition of the Hutton inquiry, and the prospects of challenges on human rights violations (see below) mean that the team have put this issue on the shelf for the time being.

The legality of the occupation

Accountability is sought for the thousands of apparently unnecessary casualties amongst civilians. One route is through the war crimes tribunal. Another would be if liability could be established for human rights violations during the war. Unfortunately, Strasbourg jurisprudence does not assist. The case of Bankovich, [16] arising from NATO's deliberate bombing of a TV station in Belgrade, enables the UK Government to argue that it did not have jurisdiction during the war itself as it had not
Assumed normal functions of government. However, human rights violations and the legality of the occupation, after the UK assumed jurisdiction, is an entirely different matter.

On 23 July a lengthy sixth opinion on the legality of the occupation by the UK was released. The law of belligerent occupation is complex and a summary of the advice has to suffice. [17] Given the continuing importance of the legality of the ongoing occupation the whole of the conclusion is set out: "In our view while the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq by the US and the UK was unlawful at international law, Resolution 1483 has rendered the continuing occupation of Iraq by the US and the UK lawful, subject to the limits on the conduct of that occupation contained in international law. In our view, the responsibilities and obligations of the US and the UK remain limited by the Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention IV, and on a proper construction of Resolution 1483 the primary responsibility for nation-building, judicial reform and economic reconstruction rests with the Special Representative appointed in accordance with operative paragraph 8. While Resolution 1483 envisages that the US and the UK will be involved in those processes, in our view such involvement must remain administrative and logistical in order for it to comply with the US and the UK's obligations under international law, which are reaffirmed by Resolution 1483." It remains to be seen how this particular chapter develops.

Human Rights violations post-occupation

As a matter of law there is no reason why the UK Government should not be held responsible for violations of human rights in the parts of Iraq for which it is responsible. For example, if civilians are killed or injured by cluster bombs used in urban areas and UK forces responsible for removing them promptly have not done so, or if medical operations have been cancelled because hospitals have not been adequately protected from looting. Violations of human rights in these, and other, circumstances may also involve breaches of provisions of GC IV. [18] Such violations might be challenged through judicial review and the HRA 1998. Contact has been made with a number of Iraqi civilians affected by violations for which the UK is responsible. A trip to Iraq has been arranged at the end of October for the purpose of taking instructions.

Conclusions

The political implications of this illegal war have not finished sounding. What role international law has played in this struggle to make the government accountable, and within that the difference our campaign has made, is not for us to say, and certainly not at this stage. One would not wish to claim too much for the part of cause lawyering. Some might say our campaign has failed as we did not stop the war, or even win our legal challenge. But that is an unnecessarily restrictive appraisal of success. From the perspective of Iraqi civilians if we put the UK Government under any extra pressure at all, so as to spare one casualty, I would argue it was worth every ounce of effort or penny spent. In any event it would be difficult to dismiss the effects of our co-ordinated legal and political strategy in the light of the extensive opportunities we had to air the case for illegality in the court of public opinion. It is simply too early to say where this road leads. Will there be future evenness in accountability for aggressive war and war crimes, or will "victor's justice" prevail? Given this unilateral action that may be seen as a hammerblow to the role of the UN in furthering the peaceful resolution of conflicts can there be an equal and opposite reaction? What is needed is a strong UN, a reformed Security Council so that the five nuclear weapons states are not also the Permanent Members, and reforms in enforcement and other procedures so that, at least, there is an expedient method of obtaining an authoritative advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. As for radical lawyering perhaps more might be achieved if we believe that we could make a (small) difference despite the forces against us.

Phil Shiner, of Public Interest Lawyers, acted for CND, Peacerights, other NGOs and Mark Thomas in the various states of this campaign.

(5345 words)

[1] For more detail contact the author via Peace Rights
[2] See Laws LJ in R v Environment Agency ex p. Marchiori [2002] EuLr 225 at para 38: "….. It seems to me……to be plain that the law of England will not contemplate what may be called a merits review of any honest decision of government upon matters of national defence policy."
[3] Article 1 of the UN Charter sets out the UN purposes the first of which is "to maintain international peace and security; and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace…. and to bring about by peaceful means…. adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."
[4] Article 2 (4) provides: "all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nation.
[5] There was a great deal of deliberately loose language in the run up to war with the public led to believe what was required was a UN mandate. Clearly a mandate can mean different things to different people (as we came to see over the debate about a second SC Resolution) and is not necessarily synonymous with an authorisation.
[6] This was established in Rome inspired by Lelia Debasso.
[7] The UN Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Authority.
[8] Official Report, Foreign Secretary's Department 7.11.02, p246.
[9] Foreign Secretary on Radio 4, 10.11.02.
[10] R (Abbasi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and another [2002] EWCA Civ.1598 concerns the human rights of internees at Guantanamo Bay.
[11] The event was recorded as part of the Channel 4 programme – "Mark Thomas… Weapons Inspector" shown on January 31.
[12] These are Professors Chinkin, Tavernier, Schabas, Goodwin-Gill, Bowring, Grief and Baxi. Any readers wishing to attend the day long public session on Saturday 8 November should contact the author.
[13] Note not an opinion as the one page written answer made no attempt to discuss other arguments than the one it asserted.
[14] It is also worth noting that in a memorandum of 24 October 2002 to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee

Professor Christopher Greenwood QC, who is an eminent international lawyer often instructed by the government had concluded that it would be possible to render active the authorisation of R 678 which "would not necessarily require a Security Council Resolution. It could be done by means of a Presidential Statement (which would require a consensus from the council)." Even that possible route to legality was not available.
[15] It will be noted that "regime change" could not, according to this advice, be an end in itself.
[16] Bankovich and others, app.no. 52207/99, EctHR judgment, 12 December 2001.
[17] International law on belligerent occupation is for the most part contained in the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV), in particular Articles 27-34 and 47-78, and the annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Law and Customs of War, on Land, (the Hague Regulations), Articles 42-56.
[18] Part II of GC IV lays down a number of provisions that give general protection to the population including protection of the wounded, sick, infirm and pregnant women (Art. 16), the protection of civilian hospitals (Art. 18), and the special protection of children (Art. 25).